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Abstract. We present a cognitive model of opinion dynamics which
studies the behavior of a population of interacting individuals in the
context of risk of natural disaster. In particular, we investigate the re-
sponse of the individuals to the information received by institutional
sources about the correct behaviors for prevention and harm reduction.
The results of our study show that alarmist opinions are more likely to be
adopted by populations, since worried people tend to share their points
of view more often than other individuals.
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1 Introduction
In the managing of natural disasters, a key passage is represented by the imple-
mentation of prevention policies. In particular, to this aim a fundamental task
of the official institutions is the correct communication of the proper behaviors
the population under risk should adopt before, during and after the catastrophic
event in order to minimize its negative consequences.
In the evaluation of a risky situation, several factors, which interact among
themselves in complex ways, have to be taken into account. In order to under-
stand which dynamics emerge and how they act in populations vulnerable to
natural risks, it is necessary to model these processes and test such models by
means of different tools, among them numerical simulations.
In this paper, we are going to address the following research issues, which
are the main points for implementing the correct policies for the cases we are
dealing with:
– How do individuals process their opinions/beliefs about risky events?
– Which is the role of information from institutional sources with respect to the
information an individual collects in his/her social groups (family, friends,
colleagues?
– Which are the collective processes of social influence by which opinions and
behaviors spread through the population?
– How much the processes described above are in their turn influenced by the
trust the citizens yield to the institutions and by their risk sensitiveness?
In order to answer to the questions above, we have to determine the internal
mechanisms of the individuals which drive the opinion dynamics both at micro-
scopic and macroscopic level. In particular, we have to take into account some
important factors. Firstly, humans tend to overestimate the risk of catastrophic
but unlikely events with respect to more common but less disastrous ones [1].
Secondly, several studies verified that the trust of the individuals towards the
sources of information becomes decisive when the available information is lit-
tle [2,3]. Moreover, it was also observed that considering situations perceived
as risky (for instance, OGM-technologies, stocking of radioactive waste, etc.),
individuals with higher trust towards official institutions (government, compa-
nies, scientists, etc.) repute catastrophic events less probable [4,5]. In short, if
we want to model correctly these processes, we have to take into account also
these dynamics, together with a more realistic picture of the mental schemes and
phenomena by means of which humans elaborate their views and beliefs [6]. The
model we have defined and utilized in this work is therefore inspired from the
social science point of view to the considerations above. On the other hand, as
we are going to show in the next section, it is formally an agent-based opinion
dynamics model, close to the Deffuant model [7,8], that is, a continuous-opinion
kinetic exchange model [9].
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we define the model
and how it is numerically implemented; in Section 3 we present the results of the
simulations and in Section 4 we discuss them; finally, the last section is dedicated
to the conclusions and perspectives.
2 The Model
We set a population of N interacting agents. Each agent i is characterized by an
opinion Oi about the risky event, i.e., the probability, as estimated by i itself,
that the catastrophic event could actually take place. The opinion is an external
variable, that is, it can be seen by other individuals. Besides, we define some
internal variables to describe the internal state of agents, as well as their mental
dynamics. Such internal variables are the risk sensitivity Ri, the tendency to
inform others βi, the trust towards the institution Ti and the trust towards
peers Πi. In this work, for seek of simplicity we assume that the trust towards
the institution is anti-correlated to that towards peers: Πi = 1 − Ti. This is a
strong but non-unrealistic approximation [10], considering that many people are
suspicious of the “official” communications, trusting more information received
by relatives, friends, or even by unknown people on the web.
In Table 1 the variables defining the agent internal and external behavior are
summarized, together with their main features.
Table 1. Scheme of the internal and external variables defining the agents.
Variable Description Notes
Oi Opinion Real number ∈ [0, 1]; evolving
Ri Risk sensitivity Integer = 0,±1; constant
βi Tendency to communicate Real number ∈ [0, 1]; constant
Ti Trust towards institution Real number ∈ [0, 1]; constant
Πi Trust towards peers Πi ≡ 1− Ti
In this paper we consider a mean-field approach, that is, we put our popu-
lation on a complete graph: every individual can interact directly with everyone
else.
2.1 Algorithm of the dynamics
Each time step of the simulation is made up of two stages: the institutional
communication stage, followed by a round of information exchange among peers.
More in depth, the generic t-th time step will take place as shown in the following.
Institutional communication - In this first stage the Institution communi-
cates to every player its own risk evaluation I. Therefore, every agent processes
this information according its opinion and internal variables. Firstly, the player
i modifies its old opinion Oi(t− 1) ≡ O
o
i following the Deffuant-like [8] rule
Ooi −→ Oi = O
o
i + Ti(I −O
o
i ) . (1)
Subsequently, Oi is further processed according i’s risk sensitivity:
Oi −→


1
2 (1 +Oi) se Ri = +1
Oi se Ri = 0
1
2Oi se Ri = −1 .
(2)
More precisely, agents with positive risk sensitivity will overestimate the insti-
tutional information, agents with negative risk sensitivity will underestimate it,
and neutral ones will not process the information further.
Once every individual has elaborated the institutional communication as de-
scribed above, the information exchange phase will take place.
Information exchange among peers - This second stage is in its turn com-
posed by N rounds. In each round a couple of agents is picked up at random.
Let us call i and j the two agents, and Oi and Oj their opinions before the
interaction, respectively. Now, the probability that player i (j) communicates
its opinion to the opponent is
Pi(j) = O
1/βi(j)
i(j) , (3)
because we assume that given the same opinion the agents with higher ten-
dency to communicate are more likely to speak, but given the same tendency to
communicate the more worried agents will also speak more often.
For simplicity, let us consider j as the “speaker” and i as the “listener” (the
symmetrical interaction where i is the speaker and j the listener will take place
in the same way). If the speaker decides not to give the listener its opinion Oj
(according previous equation, this happens with probability 1−Pj), the listener’s
opinion Oi does not change. If instead agent j actually shares its opinion, agent
i will change its own following another Deffuant-like rule:
Oi −→ O
′
i = Oi +Πi(Oj −Oi) ≡ O
′
i = Oi + (1− Ti)(Oj −Oi) . (4)
Then, the listener processes further its new opinion again according its risk
sensitivity:
O′i −→


1
2 (1 +O
′
i) se Ri = +1
O′i se Ri = 0
1
2O
′
i se Ri = −1 .
(5)
After N rounds (so that on average each player has interacted once per time
step), the information exchange ends, and the opinions of the agents become
their opinions at time t.
Initial conditions - At the beginning of every simulation, the agents are
randomly assigned an opinion between 0 and 1, always with uniform distribution.
Also the internal variables are randomly distributed, but the distribution is
not necessarily uniform, and will be specified in each case. We recall tha fact
that whilst the opinions evolve, the internal variable are constant in time. The
institutional information I, which can be seen as the “opinion” of the Institution,
is set at the start of the dynamics and never changes. All the simulation results
are averaged over 2000 independent realizations.
Asymmetrical peer interactions - We tested also a slight modification of the
algorithm described above: in the information exchange phase, instead of picking
up N times a couple of agents which share their opinions each other, we select
2N times a couple made up of a fixed speaker (which only communicates its
opinion but does not listen to the opponent’s one) and a fixed listener (which
evolves its opinion following the interaction, but does not share its original one).
Anyway, the two versions of the model show the very same behavior (apart very
small numerical differences), so that in the following we are reporting only the
results of the symmetrical interaction model.
3 Results
3.1 Balanced systems
Let us start our review considering a perfectly balanced system: not only all the
initial opinions are uniformly distributed in the real interval [0, 1], but also the
internal variables {βi, Ri, Ti}i=1,...N are picked up at random with a uniform
probability. Therefore, on average we begin with a neutral population.
First of all, we want to check if a final stationary state can be effectively
reached by the system: this is actually the case, as shown in Figure 1. Noticeably,
the convergence up to the final state is quite fast: already after very few time
steps the average opinion has acquired a stable value.
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Fig. 1. Time behavior of the average opinion of a system of N = 1000 agents for
totally non-alarmist, neutral and highly alarmist institutional information. Completely
balanced population: initial opinions, trust towards institution, tendency to speak and
risk sensitivity randomly assigned with uniform distributions.
Afterwards, it is important to understand how the populations responds to
the institutional inputs, that is, how the final average opinion behaves as a
function of the institutional information. This is shown in Figure 2.
As it is easy to see, the system shows to be more alarmist than the insti-
tution for appeasing information, but results less alarmed if instead the official
information is worrying. However, these results exhibit another interesting asym-
metry: the value I∗ of the institutional information for which the response of
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Fig. 2. Behavior of the final average opinion as a function of the institutional informa-
tion for a system of N = 1000 agents. Completely balanced population: initial opinions,
trust towards institution, tendency to speak and risk sensitivity randomly assigned with
uniform distributions. Linear fitting parameters: intercept ≃ 0.33, slope ≃ 0.43.
the population is equal to the input is not I¯ = 0.5, as one could expect since
the system is balanced, but larger (more precisely, we have here I∗ ≃ 0.58):
this counterintuitive outcome (in favor of alarmist opinions) is due to the fact
more alarmist people share their opinions more often than non-alarmists, so that
worried messages have more chances to spread throughout the entire population.
We have also to notice that in any case consensus is not reached: in the
final state it does not happen that every individual has an opinion equal to
the average, but that there is a final stationary opinion distribution, as shown
in Figure 3. As it is easy to see, the median opinions are less common in the
final configuration, especially when the system ends up in an alarmist state. In
general, even though on average the population has a well-defined view about
the risk, there are always many contrarians which oppose the majority’s opinion.
3.2 Unbalanced systems
In this subsection we investigate what happens when the system is not bal-
anced, that is, in case the distributions among agents of the internal variables
are not uniform (equivalently, their average is not equal to their median value).
In particular, we studied the behavior of the system by varying the average risk
sensitiveness and trust towards the institution.
Varying trust, balanced risk sensitiveness Let us start with the case of
systems in which the risk sensitiveness is again uniformly distributed among
agents, while the trust towards the institution has an unbalanced distribution.
More precisely, each player i is assigned with probability PT a trust Ti uniformly
distributed between 0.5 and 1 (high trust), and with probability 1− PT a trust
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Fig. 3. Final opinion distribution for totally balanced systems of N = 1000 agents
with institutional information equal to 0.10 (left) and 0.80 (right).
Ti uniformly distributed between 0 and 0.5 (low trust). Therefore, the average
trust is
〈T 〉 =
1 + 2PT
4
. (6)
It is worth to notice that as PT is tuned from 0 to 1, 〈T 〉 goes from 0.25 to 0.75.
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Fig. 4. Behavior of the final average opinion as a function of the unbalance probability
PT of the trust towards the institution for systems of N = 1000 agents, balanced risk
sensitiveness, and two different values of the institutional information.
Linear fitting parameters: a) I = 0.20, intercept ≃ 0.54 and slope ≃ −0.21; b) I = 0.80,
intercept ≃ 0.70 and slope ≃ −0.03.
In Figure 4 we show how by varying the average trust towards the institu-
tion a population responses to the official input. Understandably, when the in-
stitution communicates a non-alarmist message (I = 0.20), increasing the trust
means decreasing the final average opinion. On the other hand, when the input
is alarmist (I = 0−80) , we would expect the opposite effect: in fact, in this case
the system is much less sensitive to the trust, indeed the final average opinion is
almost constant with respect to PT (what is more, it slightly decreases with PT
increasing).
Varying risk sensitiveness, balanced trust Here we analyze the opposite
case where trust towards the institution is uniformly distributed, but risk sensi-
tiveness is not. In particular, every player i is assigned the neutral risk sensitive-
ness (Ri = 0) with probability 1/3, a positive risk sensitiveness Ri = +1 with
probability 2PR/3, and a negative one with probability 2(1− PR)/3. Therefore,
the average risk sensitiveness is
〈R〉 =
2PR − 1
3
. (7)
In this way, as PT varies from 0 to 1, 〈R〉 goes from −1/3 to 1/3.
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Fig. 5. Behavior of the final average opinion as a function of the unbalance probability
PR of the risk sensitiveness for systems of N = 1000 agents, balanced trust towards
the institution, and two different values of the institutional information.
Linear fitting parameters: a) I = 0.20, intercept ≃ 0.12 and slope ≃ 0.56; b) I = 0.80,
intercept ≃ 0.43 and slope ≃ 0.50.
In Figure 5 we show the behavior of the final average opinion as a function of
the risk sensitivity unbalance PR, again for an alarmist institutional information
(I = 0.80) and a non-alarmist one (I = 0.20). As expected, 〈Ofin〉 increases
linearly as the population increases its global risk sensitiveness, in the same way
for different values of I.
3.3 Beyond the mean-field topology
In the previous subsections we focused our study on systems in mean-field ap-
proximation, that is, populations acting on complete graphs. Then, it is also
worth to understand how a change in topology affects the outcome of the model.
In order to do that, we considered the following four networks:
a - a one-dimensional ring of N = 1000 nodes with connections to second-
nearest-neighbors (so that each agent is linked to four other individuals);
b - an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random network of N = 1000 nodes with probability of
existence of a link p = 0.1;
c - a Watts-Strogatz small-world network [11], generated from the ring defined
above with rewiring probability pr = 0.05;
d - a real network of N = 1133 users of the e-mail service of the University of
Tarragona, Spain [12], which can be approximated for high degrees with a
scale-free network network with exponent ≃ 2.
As it results clear from Figure 6, the influence of the topology is negligible,
meaning that the relevant effects are due to other factors, in particular the
internal variable distributions, as we are going to discuss in the next section.
4 Discussion
In this work we have simulated the dynamics of a population subject to risk of
natural disasters. Each agent gets information about the level of the risk, that
is, on the probability that a catastrophic event can actually take place, from
an institutional source and by exchanging opinions and ideas with other agents,
adopting an opinion as a consequence of the interactions with the institution
and peers. The individuals process the information according to their mental
attitudes and inclinations: in particular, we considered three internal features:
the trust towards the institutional sources (anticorrelated to the trust towards
peers), the risk sensitiveness and the tendency to communicate.
The main results we have obtained in our simulations are the following. First
of all, we observe that in general the global final average opinion is more alarmist
than the institutional message when the latter is reassuring, and vice versa. This
is due to the presence of agents with low trust towards the institution, which
act as “contrarians” in any situation.
Secondly, also in balanced populations (that is, populations where trust, risk
sensitiveness and tendency to communicate are uniformly distributed), in the
final state there is an asymmetry in favor of the alarmist opinions: this happens
because an alarmist agent will share its opinion more often than a non-alarmist
one with the same tendency to communicate.
Concerning the role of the internal variables, it is worth to notice that the
risk sensitiveness is more influencing than the trust towards the institution:
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Fig. 6. Behavior of the final average opinion as a function of the institutional infor-
mation for systems of N = 1000 agents. Totally balanced populations. In particular:
a) One-dimensional ring, b) Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network; c) Watts-Strogatz small-world net-
work; d) Real e-mail network.
Linear fitting parameters: a) intercept ≃ 0.31, slope ≃ 0.46; b) intercept ≃ 0.31, slope
≃ 0.45; c) intercept ≃ 0.30, slope ≃ 0.46; d) intercept ≃ 0.30, slope ≃ 0.47.
indeed, by varying the distribution of the former the final average opinion results
much more affected than by changing the latter. Therefore, according to these
results, when the institution transmits appeasing messages, if we want that the
population follows the official indication, it would be better to act on the risk
sensitiveness of the citizens than on their trust.
Finally, we have checked that the topology on which the dynamics takes
place is substantially irrelevant for the final fate of the system: this is not a
complete novelty, since there are some social dynamics processes which were
experimentally shown to be independent from the details of the networks [13].
5 Conclusions and perspectives
In this paper, we have applied a computational approach to the study of collec-
tive risk evaluation processes. While we know, for example, that individuals in
many situations tend to overestimate the risk of catastrophic events, little we
know about the collective effects of those biases. We have simulated the joint
effect of institutional communication with individual opinion exchange, showing
how social interaction modifies the effects of institutional communication in a
complex way. Individuals, exchanging opinions under a similarity bias, can polar-
ize against institutional messages and reduce their effectiveness. Our simulations
also highlighted the prevalent role of risk sensitiveness with respect to trust, in-
dependently of connectivity. Alarmist opinions prevail in the model because they
incite agents to share more. Risk sensitivity, thus, is much more effective as an
intervention target with respect to risk perception.
In the future, we plan to extend these results and to validate them. For
validation ex ante, natural experiments could be searched for, that is, empirical
studies where individuals are exposed to experimental and control conditions by
policy choices, nature, or other factors outside the control of the investigators. On
the other hand, validation ex post would benefit from a cross-methodologically
approach, hybridizing simulation with experiments, online or in the laboratory.
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